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Standing Up for Flast: Taxpayer
and Citizen Standing to Raise
Constitutional Issues
BY

DAVIDs. BOGEN*
INTRODUCTION

Individual citizens and taxpayers have occasionally sued
the federal government for alleged violations of the Constitution even though the alleged violation did not deprive the
plaintiffs of any property or freedom. 1 The thrust of these suits
has been that the government has violated its obligations to its
citizens and taxpayers by exceeding constitutional limits. The
Supreme Court has consistently held that such plaintiffs lack
standing to sue.
One exception to this pattern was Flast v. Cohen. 2 In Flast,
the Court held that taxp~yers had standing to challenge federal
expenditures which allegedly violated the constitutional prohibition against establishment of religion. The Court based its
holding on a finding that such taxpayers had a "personal
stake" unlike that of citizens or taxpayers in other non-injury
suits. In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has purported
to distinguish Flast or has displayed hostility toward it. 3 The
present position of the Court on the standing of citizens or
taxpayers to raise constitutional issues is uncertain. 4 This article examines the bases for expanding or limiting such standing
and proffers a rationale for the Court's decision in Flast v.
Cohen.
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland. B.A. 1962, LL.B. 1965, Harvard;
LL.M. 1967, New York University.
1
See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974);
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968);
Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
z 392 u.s. 83 (1968).
~ See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974);
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974). In Richardson, Justice Powell said,
"I •.. would lay rest to the approach undertaken in Flast." I d. at 180.
4
See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974). In Richardson,
Justices Marshall, Stewart, Brennan, and Douglas disagreed with the plurality's use
of Flast to deny standing. Id. at 185-207.
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FLAST V. COHEN: THE CASE IN CONTROVERSY

In Flast v. Cohen, 5 taxpayers claimed that federal expenditures made to finance instruction and to purchase textbooks
and other materials in parochial schools violated the establishment and free exercise of religion clause of the first amendment. The three-judge lower court held that the taxpayers
lacked standing. 6
The Supreme Court noted that the question of standing
concerns whether the party bringing suit is a proper party, not
the justiciability of a particular issue. 7 At a minimum, the case
and controversy limitation on federal court jurisdictions requires that the parties be adverse so they will raise and thoroughly argue opposing views. This adversity must be the product of something more than the mere fact that the parties are
on opposing sides.
The 'gist of the question of standing' is whether the party
seeking relief has 'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. ' 9

In Flast, the Court found the requisite "personal stake" because the plaintiffs satisfied a two-nexus test:
The nexus demanded of federal taxpayers has two aspects to
it. First, the taxpayer must establish a logical link between
that status and the type of legislative enactment attacked.
Thus, a taxpayer will be a proper party to allege the unconstitutionality only of exercises of congressional power under the
taxing and spending clause of Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution.
It will not be sufficient to allege an incidental expenditure of
tax funds in the administration of an essentially regulatory
statute . . . . Secondly, the taxpayer must establish a nexus
between that status and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement alleged. Under this requirement, the tax5 392 u.s. 83 (1968).
• Flast v. Gardner, 271 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). The expenditures had been
made under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.
1 392 U.S. at 99-100.
8 U.S. CONST. art. ill, § 2, cl. 1.
' 392 U.S. at 99 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
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payer must show that the challenged enactment exceeds specific constitutional limitations imposed upon the exercise of
the congressional taxing and spending power and not simply
that the enactment is generally beyond the powers delegated
to Congress by Art. I, § 8. 10

Justice Harlan contended that the Court's criteria did not
demonstrate a "personal stake." There was no suggestion that
any tax was improperly levied or that the challenged expenditure affected the taxpayer's tax burden. If the government did
not spend the money for the challenged purpose, it would have
spent it for another purpose or incurred a smaller deficit. The
taxpayer did not and could not request a return of funds. The
only connections taxpayers qua taxpayers have to the government are that they are within its sovereign power (as citizens,
residents, or persons owning or receiving assets within the territory of the taxing power), and have, through a tax, paid the
government money that has become part of a general fund
which is used to pay governmental expenditures. 11
Although Justice Harlan argued that taxpayers should not
have standing in the Flast situation, 12 he agreed that the
taxpayer seeking to stop allegedly unconstitutional action by
his government is sufficiently adverse to present a "case" or
"controversy" within the meaning of Article ill. 13 However,
since the taxpayer is "non-Hohfeldian," 14 the relief requested
[d. at 102-03.
n Id. at 116-19.
The relief available to such a plaintiff consists entirely of the vindication of
rights held in common by all citizens . . . . [T]he United States holds its
general funds, not as stockholder or trustee for those who have paid its
imposts, but as surrogate for the population at large.
Id. at 118-19 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
•z Id. at 116 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
11 ld. at 130, 131 n.21 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
•• Justice Harlan stated:
I have here employed the phrases "Hohfeldian" and "non-Hohfeldian"
plaintiffs to mark the distinction between the personal and proprietary interests of the traditional plaintiff, and the representative and public interests
of the plaintiff in a public action.
Id. at 119 n.5.
The "non-Hohfeldian" plaintiff seeks "vindication of rights held in common by
all citizens"; he cannot ask for damages. Rather, he invokes the court's power to order
particular behavior by government officials. Such orders are equitable in nature and
the courts in such cases have traditionally considered whether under all the circumII
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is equitable in nature and the Court has power to determine
whether such relief should be granted. Justice Harlan concluded that unless such plaintiffs were given standing by Congress, the likelihood of a substantial increase in the number of
generalized grievances about the conduct of government made
it wise to refuse to give relief to such plaintiffs. 15 In contrast,
Justice Douglas' concurrence in Flast was based on the proposition that citizens should act as "private attorneys general" to
make certain that the Constitution is followed. 16
As noted by Justice Harlan, the Flast criteria are not necessary to achieve the "adverseness" which results from one
having a personal stake in the controversy. Justice Powell
noted in United States v. Richardson, drawing on Harlan's
dissent in Flast:
A plaintiff's incentive to challenge an expenditure does not
turn on the 'unconnected fact' that it relates to a regulatory
rather than a spending program . . . or on whether the constitutional provision on which he relies is a 'specific limitation' upon Congress' spending powers. 17

Rather, a plaintiff who is concerned that tax revenues are being
used for an unconstitutional program will be equally concerned
regardless of whether the money is expended in direct grants
or in administrative costs of a regulatory program. Indeed,
some large regulatory agencies may be more costly than programs of direct aid to private schools} 8 The interest of the
taxpayer is equally strong whether the expenditure is specifically prohibited or simply not authorized by the Constitution.
stances equitable relief is warranted. Even if the law has been violated, the equity
court may refuse to grant remedies. See Comment, Threat of Enforcement-Prerequisite of a Justiciable Controversy, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 106, 126 (1962).
15 392 U.S. at 129 n.18 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
11 "I would not be niggardly . . . in giving private attorneys general standing to
sue." Id. at 111 (Douglas, J., concurring).
17 United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 183 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
18
Federal funds expended for non-public schools under Titles I and II of the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 totaled $50,175,000 in 1971. 'l'HE
PRESIDENT's CoMMISSION oN ScHooL FINANCE, Pusuc Am To NoNPUBLIC SCHooLS v
(1971). Expenditures for the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Civil Aeronautics Board were $71,127,000 and $61,760,000 respectively for 1971. EXECUTIVE OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT 438, 467 (1972).
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Persons may be more opposed to federal expenditures if the
states are competent to act in the area in question than they
would be to a program which violated a specific constitutional
prohibition. 19
A taxpayer's interest in these controversies, if he is not
deprived of life, liberty, or property, is that the government
should act in a constitutional manner. All citizens have a similar claim that the government should behave constitutionally:
Since the powers and procedures of government were established and limited by agreement of the citizens, 20 the government has no claim to legitimacy apart from that agreement. As
parties to the agreement, the citizens and their successors
should have the ability to compel the government to conform
to it. The taxpayer is limited to challenges of government expenditures, whereas the citizen may object to any government
misbehavior. The citizen's standing to object to governmental
activity in general should be analyzed in the same manner as
the standing of taxpayers to object to expenditures.
The assertion that citizens should be able to compel the
government to follow constitutional limitations does not inevitably lead to the conclusion that they have a right to invoke the
judicial process for this purpose. Neither the language of Article ill21 nor the history of this right as an Article ill "case or
See, e.g., Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S.447 (1923). Conservative commentators, such as William F. Buckley, have been vociferous in their condemnation of federal
control.
Let . • • localities experiment with different solutions, and let the natural
desire of the individual for more goods, and better education, and more
leisure, find satisfaction in individual encounters with the marketplace, in
the growth of private schools, in the myraid economic and charitable activities which, because they took root in the individual imagination and impulse, take organic form, and then let us see whether we are better off than
we would be living by decisions made between nine and five in Washington
office rooms . • • .
W. BuCKLEY, UP FRoM LIBERALISM 228-29 (1968).
211 U.S. CaNST. preamble.
21 Dictionary definitions of "case" are circular. WEBSTER's SEVENTH CoLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 129 (7th ed. 1971) defines "case,'' as used in law, as "[a] suit or action in
law or equity." If the power of the court to entertain a suit depends on whether it is a
"case,'' the court can entertain a suit only if it is a suit.
The dictionary is even less helpful with respect to "controversy." Its use in article
ill to describe judicial power over matters involving a state or the United States as a
party or diversity actions is not reflected in modem common usage. Id. at 182.
11
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controversy" 22 compel a decision either way on the existence of
such a right. The function of positing such a right is simply to
assure the citizen's ability to make the government obey the
constitution. Therefore, the critical question should be whether
the citizen's desire to have the government conform to constitutional commands is most effectively secured by judicial review. If so, the right of the citizen to have the government obey
constitutional provisions should be cognizable in court. This
question should have been the focus of the Court in Flast. To
decide whether the result in Flast was proper, it is necessary
22
Although an inquiry into the rights of citizens and taxpayers at the time of the
adoption of article ill may be relevant to this question, such an examination is not
helpful because the Constitution represented a radical change in the structure of
government. In eighteenth-century England, the ultimate power to create, alter, and
determine the framework of government rested with the King and Parliament. Parliament:
can regulate or new model the succession to the crown; as was done in the
reign of Henry vm and William ill. It can alter the established religion of
the land . . . . It can change and create afresh even the constitution of the
kingdom and of parliaments themselves; as was done by the act of union,
and the several statutes for triennial and septennial elections.
1 BLACKSTONE CoMMENTARIES 161 (6th ed. 1765). If there were objection to a governmental act, Parliament had the final authority as to the act's propriety. Even action clearly
contrary to established statute or custom could be legalized by Acts of Indemnity. A.
DICEY, THE LAw OF THE CoNSTITUTION 49-50 (lOth ed. 1965). The citizen's right not to
be deprived of life, liberty, or property was coextensive with the sovereignty of Parliament. See D. KEIR, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF MODERN BRITAIN SINCE 1485 at 29495 (8th ed. 1966). All objections to the operations of government would have been
addressed to Parliament, a political body, rather than to the judiciary. DICEY, supra,
at 63. In other words, the English citizen in the eighteenth century had no right to a
particular framework of government. Id. at 91.
The English citizen may have had an idea of natural law-of how government
ought to be structured-but he had no conception that his ideas of the proper operations of government should be judicially enforceable. Id. at 47-48.
Meanwhile the new American nation was developing a unique governmental form.
The American Revolution was originally justified in English terms. The King had
violated the conditions under which his American subjects consented to be governed
and, thereby, had justified the political act of revolution. See BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 46-47 (1967). In the decade after independence,
however, disenchantment with the English concept of representative rule grew. The
will of the people was not identified with the acts of the state legislatures. See G.
WooD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 at 280 (1969). The "people"
were viewed as an entity distinct from their representatives. The Constitution was
proclaimed as being established by "the people," not legislatures. U.S. CoNST. preamble. Only in America was the framework of government a product of a compact among
the citizens. Thus, only in the United States could a citizen justifiably believe himself
to have a right to have the government operate in a particular fashion.
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to examine citizen standing with a view toward the effectiveness of vindicating citizens' constitutional rights in court in
light of the interests of the parties. 23 Examination of these interests demonstrates that the Court reached the right result for
the wrong reasons.
fl.

THE INTEREST OF THE PARTIES

A. Non-Political Injury Suits: The Better Plaintiff Rule
Whenever an unconstitutional governmental action injures a person (the "victim") or his property, all citizens ofthat
government may feel injured as well. This feeling flows from
several sources. They may perceive that, as electors, they are
responsible for, and discredited by, the unconstitutional actions of the government. Further, as citizens, their relationship
to the government is based on the Constitution, and violation
of that document provides a potential threat to every citizen's
relationship with his government.
Nevertheless, the courts will not permit all citizens to
bring suit to halt the government's acts. It is thought that the
victim will present the issues better and that separate suit by
the citizen may result in poor decisions.
If a citizen brings suit, the court's natural response is to
ask "why isn't the victim here?" If the victiJn does not feel
sufficiently injured to seek redress, the injury appears minimal.
The court is thus apt to give insufficient weight to the seriousness of the injury.
The presence of the citizen could also produce inadequate
consideration of all possible issues. The injury to the citizen is
basically an affront to his conception of the constitutional functioning of government. His concern with a particular constitutional guarantee may suppress any interest in exploring every
possible defense to the governmental action. The affected individual is interested in all possible defenses. By taking only the
victim's case, the court may discover that a non-constitutional
"The interest of the parties" refers to the distinction between proprietary and
political interests, compare section IIA infra with section liB infra, as well as the
further division between interests in common to all persons and interests applicable
to minority groups, see section m infra.
23
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issue will dispose of the problem or that several constitutional
questions deserve consideration.
The vigor with which the citizen plaintiff will press the
case may also be suspect~ Since he stands to lose nothing in the
way of personal property or freedom of action, he may raise an
issue as idle speculation.- Some citizens, either individually or
supported by larger groups, would pursue the case vigorously
on all grounds but others would not.
Other problems would arise if both citizens and victims
were permitted to sue for injuries to the victim. Since the citizen's suit would not preclude a suit brought by the victim, 21
multiple law suits over the same factual problem would result.
Further; the citizen~s suit would be stare decisis in a later suit
by the victim. Since the citizen is not likely to present as appealing a case as the victim, allowing the citizen to sue may
place an e~tra burden on the victim of overcoming the effect
of.adverse stare decisis. For all these reasons, the courts have
wisely refused to grant citizen or taxpayer standing to seek
remedies for injuries to identifiable individuals. .
Occasionally, an act results both in specific injury to an
irid~vidual and a more general harm to a group. For example,
a proposed development may harm adjacent property owners
or property owners whose land is taken. At the same time, the
nature of the development could result in ugliness or pollution
that would effect everyone who uses the area. 25 The interests of
the latter group are very distinct from those of the former and
may make it desirable for both to sue. The property owner's
interest may be satisfied by sufficient compensation while the
public user can vindicate his interest only by stopping the project. Since the property owner's financial interests may run
counter to the interest of the public user, standing should be
granted tQ both groups.
The conflict between the interest of the person suffering
n "[M]embers of a class not present as parties to the litigation may be bound
by the judgment where they are in fact adequately represented by parties who are
present . . . ."Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940). The interest of the victim
is quite distinct from that of the citizen and cannot be adequately represented by the
citizen alone without the victim's consent.
.. This situation occurs frequently in environmental suits. See United States v.
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club
v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
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specific injury and the interests of persons injured generally
will not occur if the general injury is simply that the government acted wrongly in injuring the specific individual. Recompense for the specific injury will sufficiently satisfy the interest
of the citizen. Given the possibility of both citizen and victim
satisfaction by means of the victim's suit, the above mentioned
reasons for granting standing only to the victim are again applicable. Thus even in the relaxed form of standing in federal
statutory actions, the Court has mandated that a plaintiff show
more specific injury than violation of the statute and disagreement with such action. 26

B. Political Injury Suits: Wrong Reasons for the Right Result
Some laws or activities produce no specific harm despite
their alleged unconstitutionality. When a senator is appointed
to an office whose remuneration he voted to increase, the nature of the violation threatens no citizen's life, liberty, or property.27 Rather, a possibility exists that the political process was
skewed when the legislature voted to increase the salary for
that position. Such an injury will be referred to as a "political
injury." Since the right to have government follow the prescribed constitutional norms is common to all citizens, no single citizen has a better right than another to raise the issue.
The lack of a victim in the sense used in the preceding discussion removes a major reason to bar the- citizen suit. The willingness of a particular citizen to bring suit indicates sufficient
injury and resourcefulness to allow that citizen to bring suit.
In a suit by a citizen to remedy a "political injury," the
citizen plaintiff is as much a victim as any other possible plaintiff. While financial or other personal loss may occur as a result
of a "political injury," it would not be the type of injui:y with
which the violated constitutional provision is concerned. 28 The
See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
n The violation is of U.S. CoNST. art. 1, § 6. ·Whether specific harm results was
intensely debated during the nomination of William Saxbe as Attorney General. A suit
claiming violation of this provision when Justice Black was appointed to the Supreme
Court was dismissed for lack of standing. Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937). See
text accompanying notes 68-69 for a discussion of the case.
21 The constitutional provisions in question protect the political process froll;l
being improperly influenced and are not designed to punish the individual who might
21
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type of injury which the Constitution forbids in these cases is
that done to all citizens. In several cases subsequent to Flast,
members of the Court have given different reasons for denying
standing to such injured citizens. However, the reasons proffered have been inadequate.
1. Abstract Nature of Issues in Suit by Citizen for Political
Injury

A "political injury" is by definition abstract-i.e., no individual can show loss of property or impairment of liberty. The
only loss is of the right to have the government act in a specified way. Whether the government acts in a certain way may
or may not be personally beneficial to the individual. For example, whether a Congressman who is a member of the reserves
will favor the military is entirely speculative-his connection
may result in a very critical view of their function, while stripping him of his reserve commission may make him more rather
than less amenable to military interests.
In Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 29
the Court discussed the reasons for giving preference to concrete injuries by saying:
[S]tanding to sue may not be predicated upon an interest
. . . which is held in common by all members of the public,
because of the necessarily abstract nature of the injury all
citizens share. Concrete injury, whether actual or threatened,
is that indispensable element of a dispute which serves in
part to cast it in a form traditionally capable of judicial resolution. . . . This personal stake is what the Court has consistently held enables a complainant authoritatively to present
to a court a complete perspective upon the adverse consequences flowing from the specific set of facts undergirding his
grievance. . . . Only concrete injury presents the factual
context within which a court, aided by parties who argue
within the context, is capable of making decision. 30
otherwise obtain office, etc. The constitutional right therefore is that of the citizen qua
citizen and not of the incidentally injured individual. "Ordinarily, one may not claim
standing in this Court to vindicate the constitutional rights of some third party."
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953). See also Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S.
288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Sedler, Standing to Assert Constitutional
Jus Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71 YALE L.J. 599 (1962).
Zl 418 u.s. 208 (1974).
30
Id. at 220-21.
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This attack is filled with conclusions rather than reasons.
The "abstract injury" also presents a "factual context." There
is no speculation about what kind of conduct has occurred. The
challenge which the Court raises is whether the citizen-plaintiff
presents "a complete perspective upon the adverse consequences flowing from the specific set of facts." The "political
injury" stems from a violation of prophylactic rules designed
to prevent impropriety in the political process. For example,
the rule requiring senators to be thirty years of age 31 appears
designed to assure a quantity of experience and maturity. A
particular twenty-eight-year-old person may have experience
and maturity far beyond his years, but the adverse consequences of his election are that the rules have been violated and
the individualization which the rules intended to avoid has
become the fact. The individual who is willing to pay the costs
of litigation will claim that all citizens have an interest in
preventing such violations. This impetus thus insures the presentation of "a complete perspective upon adverse consequences" to the courts.
The Court in Schlesinger felt that denial of standing for
abstract injuries furthers the principle of avoiding unnecessary
constitutional adjudication. Concrete injury indicates there is
a real need to exercise the power of judicial review in order to
protect the interests of the complaining party. 32 However, the
Court is bootstrapping. The interest of the complaining party
in political injury cases is to preserve the kind of government
which he feels the Constitution provides. The Court can find
that there is no need to resolve the question only if it refuses
to acknowledge the interest of the citizen in preserving the
constitutional system.
Finally, concrete injury is said to assure "the framing of
relief no more broad than required by the precise facts. " 33 1f the
political injury ·consists of continued or threatened actions, the
remedy will be an order requiring the cessation of the unconstitutional activities. If the act has occurred in the past and the
01 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3. "No person shall be a Senator who shall not have
attained to the Age of thirty Years."
' 2 Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221 (1974) .
.. Id. at 222.
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Court can only deal with the consequences of it, remedial problems may, indeed, be difficult. However, remedial solutions to
concrete injuries may also be complex. Environmental injuries
may not be compensable in dollar damages, 34 yet suits have not
been dismissed on the grounds of remedial difficulty. The
Court is unconvincing when it complains of possible overbreadth in remedy. Surely the Court, if it took such suits,
would tread carefully to limit the disruption of the political
process.
2. Sporadic Nature of Review
Justice Powell, concurring in United States v.
Richardson, 35 argued that citizen-taxpayer standing should be
denied because of the sporadic nature of review it would provide. Such review was felt to be an even less desirable system
than that which would have been provided by the Council of
Revision, rejected by the Constitutional Convention.
Unrestrained standing in federal taxpayer or citizen suits
would create a remarkably illogical system of judicial supervision of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government.
·Randolph's proposed Council of Revision, which was repeatedly rejected by the Framers, at least had the virtue of being
systematic; every law passed by the legislature automatically
would have been previewed by the Judiciary before the law
could take effect. On the other hand, since the Judiciary
cannot select the taxpayers or citizens who bring suit or the
nature of the suits, the allowance of public actions would
produce uneven and sporadic review, the quality of which
would be influenced by the resources and skill of the particular plaintiff.38
On reflection, however, the irregular nature of review inherent in ·citizen suits· may be a virtue rather than a vice. It
remedies the most glaring defects of the Council of Revision.
First, the citizen suit challenges only the law's constitutionality, not its wisdom. 37 Even if a Council of Revision were lim34

See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412

u.s. 669 (1973).
418 u.s. 166, 189-91 (1974).
35

:st

st

!d. (Powell, J ., concurring).
The original proposal for a Council of Revision suggested a combination of court
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ited to constitutional review, the power to review all legislation
might tempt such a body to strike down laws with which it
disagreed.
Second, should a Council of Revision limit itself to constitutional review, it would probably perform the task poorly. The
volume of legislative and executive acts subject to review would
make conscientious decisions on constitutionality impossible.
Should the number of acts be reduced, automatic review would
still make it difficult to focus on and explore the constitutional
deficiencies. The citizen-taxpayer suit avoids these difficulties.
The costs of litigation reduce the volume of acts to be reviewed
to manageable proportions and assure presentation of sufficiently focused arguments.
Powell identifies two further difficulties stemming from
the sporadic nature of citizen suits. One is that the quality of
judicial review will be uneven and will depend on the wealth
and skill of the plaintiff. This problem does not distinguish
citizen "political injury" suits from any other suits. Victims
cover the spectrum of skills and resources which they can
devote to litigation. The citizen "political injury" suit is likely
to be presented as well as the suit in which a "victim" urges
relief.
·
The second concern with citizen standing is that such
standing might result in most litigation being brought by a
limited number of political groups which have been disappointed in the legislative process. If the challenges come only
from wealthy or well-organized groups, the impact of such suits
may result in some distortion of the total mass of legislative
and executive action. 38 The impact on governmental actions
will be more random if suits depend on existence of a victim.
Fears of political power distortion through citizen-taxpayer
suits can be greatly exaggerated. In all likelihood, groups willand executive to veto legislation. The grounds for such a veto were not limited to the
Constitution. Eventually, the presidential veto was accepted by the original convention and served the purpose of Randolph's proposal. See 1M. FARRAND, THE REcoRDS
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 21 (1911); J. GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801 at 208-210 (1971).
u H the legislature's power is limited only at the behest of certain social groups,
the resulting network of laws will favor those groups more so than if no groups or all
groups challenged such laws.
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ing to pay the costs of litigation do so because they feel important principles have been violated and that a court will so find.
Serious affronts to fundamental principles are likely to find
citizen-group challengers while baseless or trivial claims will be
deterred by the costs of litigation. The few baseless or trivial
claims or claims brought only to buttress a particular political
position may be an acceptable price to pay to assure the integrity of governmental operations.
3.

Compelled Confrontation

The justices who would deny standing to citizens and taxpayers in "political injury" suits have expressed their desire to
avoid confrontation with coordinate branches of government.39
However, if the "political injury" is both sufficiently serious
u United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
"[R]epeated and essentially head-on confrontations between the life-tenured branch
and the representative branches of government will not, in the long run, be beneficial
to either." See also Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208,
222 (1974).
Repeated confrontations with coordinate branches of government can result in
those branches retaliating against the courts-the legislature by its control of finances
and jurisdiction and the executive through the power to appoint justices and the need
for executive support to implement decisions. The heart of the Court's defense against
this has been that it is only doing its duty. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137 (1803).
However, if a decision may rest on a non-constitituional base, the Court cannot
justify reaching the constitutional issue. Many grounds exist for avoiding constitutional decisions. See Ashwanderv. TVA, 297 U.S. 288,341 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring):
The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.'. . . 3. The Court will not 'formulate a
rule ~f constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to
which it is to be applied.'. . . 4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also
present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of . . . .
7. 'When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question and even
if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that
this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly
possible by which the question may be avoided.'
ld. at 346-48. Such refusal may be based on the behavior of the party seeking relief
("[t]he Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of
one who has availed himself of its benefits." ld. at 348); the lack of adversariness
("[t]he Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, nonadversary, proceeding . . . .'' Id. at 346); or the failure of the plaintiff to show injury
("[t]he Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who
fails to show that he is injured by its operation.'' ld. at 347).
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and suitable for judicial resolution, the wish to avoid confrontation does not justify refusal to grant standing.
The fear of confrontation or of assuming a role of "general
supervision" 40 may be exaggerated. Citizens or taxpayers
should be unable to sue when governmental action results in
potential victim plaintiffs. Thus, citizens should have no
standing to challenge regulatory programs; such programs produce readily determinable victims. Permissible litigation for
citizens would be largely confined to spending programs and
discretionary appointments.
In such cases, the substantive law of federal spending
power41 and discretion in appointments42 would result in the
dismissal of most suits for failure to state a claim. A readiness
to resolve the few claims of unconstitutional action which fit
within the "political injury" definition and are outside of the
broad discretionary powers in the legislative and executive
branches would do little to damage respect for the judiciary.
4. Adequacy of Political Remedy

"Our system of government leaves many crucial decisions
to the political processes. The assumption that if respondents
40

United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
Justice Powell argues that the Court has historically limited its role to vindicating
rights of
individual citizens and minority groups against oppressive or discriminatory
government action. It is this role, not some amorphous general supervision
of the operations of government, that has maintained public esteem for the
federal courts and has permitted the peaceful coexistence of the countermajoritarian implications of judicial review and the democratic principles
upon which our Federal Government in the final analysis rests.
Id.
u "Congress has a substantive power to tax and appropriate for the general welfare, limited only by the requirement that it shall be exercised for the common benefit
as distinguished from some mere local purpose." United States v. Gerlach Live Stock
Co., 339 U.S. 725, 738 (1950). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
u Most cases involving appointment to government office have involved an available victim injured by dismissals, suspensions, or refusals to renew contracts. Challenges to appointments on the grounds of violating the rights of a .competitor also
provide a classic victim. If the challenge is based on violation of constitutional provisions for appointment, the Court has found that citizen complainants have no standing. Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937). Nevertheless, there are very few explicit
restrictions on appointments. Most restrictions on appointments are in legislation
creating the office, so issues of standing become statutory.
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have no standing to sue, no one would have standing, is not a
reason to find standing." 43 This quote from the Court's opinion
in Schlesinger turns the argument for citizen-taxpayer standing on its head. All citizens should have a right to assure that
the government is acting in a legitimate fashion. The existence
of a specific "victim" will permit the Court to find that the
citizen-plaintiff is not the appropriate party. However, where
no victim exists, there should be no impediment to citizen
standing.
The reference to the political process begs the question.
Although the Constitution leaves many issues of public policy
to the discretion of the legislature and the executive, few issues
of co.nstitutional interpretation are explicitly committed to
those branches. Since the Constitution cannot be changed except through the amendment process, 44 it is largely Immune
from the majoritarian political process. If the constitutional
provision in question is intended to protect a particular right
from the majoritarian political process, the Court should not
remand the plaintiff to those same processes. The critical question should center on tpe nature of the constitutional provision
in question and whether the particular provision would be more
effective if enforced by citizen suits. This issue has not been
addressed by the Court.

ill.

STANDING AS A FUNCTION OF INTERESTS PROTECTED BY THE
CONSTITUTION: THE BETTER PLAINTIFF REVISITED

The courts have viewed standing from its own perspective-whether the plaintiff has a sufficient stake to guarantee
adverse parties and whether the issue can be dealt with by the
court. However, the underlying concern should be whether judicial review will best ensure that the Constitution is followed.
A substantial consensus appears to favor litigation and judicial
review as the ultimate assurance of constitutional obedience.45
This feeling in tum involves the assumption that the Court is

u.s.

418
208, 227 (1974).
U.S. CONST. art. V.
u President Nixon's compliance with the Court's orders in United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683 (1974), is some evidence ofthis acceptance. See also C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE
AND THE Coi.JRT: JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A DEMOCRACY (1960).
u

u

HeinOnline -- 67 Ky. L.J. 162 1978-1979

1978-79]

TAXPAYER AND CITIZEN STANDING

163

the most acceptable body for interpretation of constitutional
provisions. Standing doctrine, like related justiciability issues,
should be built upon assuring the acceptance of the decision
and of the necessity for any resulting confrontation with another governmental branch. To ensure this acceptance, standing doctrine should be interpreted with a view toward the particular constitutional provision alleged to have been violated
and whether that provision can best be enforced by citizen
suits.
A. Individual Standing

The Constitution explicitly prohibits certain actions. Most
of these prohibitions are intended to prevent harm to the individual by the government. The standing question here is
usually easily resolved; violation of such a prohibition causes
injury to the life, liberty, or property of an individual. In some
situations it may be difficult to find standing for violations of
individual rights. In Warth v. Seldin, 48 the Court denied standing to a variety of individuals and groups who had alleged that
restrictive zoning practices violated their fourteenth amendment rights. There were further problems of ripeness, mootness, and third party (jus tertii) standing. However, even in
Warth, the Court was able to posit a plaintiff who would have
standing because he was directly affected by the challenged
act. Thus, while disputes may arise as to appropriate plaintiffs,
a hypothetical legitimate plaintiff can invariably be perceived
when the government allegedly invades a prohibition directed
at securing individual rights. The individual victim makes
standing an easy question with respect to most constitutional
provisions. Since most claims alleging constitutional violations
challenge provisions which protect identifiable groups, there
will be a better plaintiff than an ordinary citizen in most cases.

B. Federalism and State Standing
The Constitution establishes various institutions of govu 422 U.S. 490 (1975). For factors showing who might be a proper plaintiff in a
Warth type suit, see Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977), where standing to challenge restrictive zoning practices was found for an
individual who alleged that he sought and would qualify for a particular planned
project that was forbidden by the zoning law.
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ernment and provides grants of power to those institutions and
prohibitions on particular conduct by those institutions. The
grants of power are a means of allocating power among the
branches of the federal government and between the federal
and state governments. 47
This allocation of power may serve to protect the individual citizen; 48 he is less likely to have legislation affect him
adversely if fewer institutions have the power to do so. If the
individual is deprived of life, liberty, or property through a
governmental act which exceeds the powers granted the acting·
body, the individual will have standing. 49 However, if the only
adverse effect is that action is taken with which the individual
disagrees and believes inappropriate for the acting body to
take, there is a victim with a better basis for suit: the governmental body whose power has been usurped. 50 In such cases,
the issue raised is one· of standing for the governmental
body-most frequently the state.
The state may attempt to bring sujt on behalf of its citizens. This effort runs afoul of two problems. First, if the citizens themselves are inappropriate plaintiffs, the state cannot
obtain standing by relying on them. 51 Second, the proper institution to represent the citizens may be the federal governu With respect to concepts of federalism, see U.S. CoNsT. amend. X: "The powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
43 See Strong, Court vs. Constitution: Disparate Distortions of the Indirect Limitations in the American Constitutional Framework, 54 N.C. L. REv. 125 {1976).
n If the government seeks to deprive the individual of life, liberty or property in
a judicial proceeding, the individual may raise the unconstitutionality of the government's action in defense. If the act takes place outside a judicial proceeding, standing
to sue may depend on whether the constitutional right allegedly invaded was for the
benefit of the injured party. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 {1936).
50
See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 {1968). The Court refers to Mrs. Frothingham's
suit to prevent a federal spending program known as the Maternity Act of 1921:
In essence, Mrs. Frothingham was attempting to assert the States' interest in their legislative prerogatives and not a federal taxpayer's interest in
being free of taxing and spending in contravention of specific constitutional
limitations imposed upon Congress' taxing and spending power.
Id. at 105.
•• Citizens do not become more appropriate plaintiffs because some other body
represents them. If the state is appropriate, it must be because of the state's interest
and not that of its citizens. See Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660 {1976), which
says that a State may sue only when its sovereign interests, not merely the personal
claims of its citizens, are implicated.
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ment. 52 While the state may be the guardian of its citizens visa-vis other states, the federal government is the guardian if the
relationship under attack is national. 53 If the state wishes to sue
on its own behalf to prevent federal action in an area which the
state claims is reserved for state action, it will have standing
or can create a situation in which individuals have standing if
it passes legislation which conflicts with federal law. 54
Thus, when the complained-of act is a product of a conflict
over the allocation of powers, citizen-taxpayer standing is not
needed in order to enforce a particular constitutional provision.
A better plaintiff exists in the form of the offended government
body. When a bona fide conflict exists over the allocation of
powers, the appropriate institution will possess the requisite of
adversity and a "personal stake."
C. Institutional Processes

Some constitutional prohibitions are not directed at protecting individuals from injury by government but are directed
at preserving the integrity of government itself. It is this group
of protections which causes the greatest difficulty in standing
analysis; violation of the constitutional command provides no
specific victim. No individual can claim physical or economic
injury, but a potential threat to the democratic processes is
called into question. For example, there is a minimum age
u See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
It cannot be conceded that a State as parens patriae may institute
judicial proceedings to protect citizens of the United States from the operation of the statutes thereof • • . . In that field it is the United States, and
not the State, which represents them as parens patriae . • . .
Id. at 485-86.
53 Id.
51 However, the federal law may be designed to prevent such a clash. For example,
conditional grants do not conflict with any state law, but merely fail to operate when
the state does not meet the condition: "[T]he powers of the State are not invaded,
since the statute imposes no obligation but simply extends an option which the state
is free to accept or reject." Id. at 480. If the state chooses not to legislate because it
does not want the federal grant, there can be no conflict. If the state chooses to fulfill
the conditions of the grant, it will benefit from the federal action and thus have no
basis for suit. Ashwanderv. TVA, 297 U.S. 288,348 (1936). However, if the state wants
the federal grant but does not want to meet all of the federal conditions, it may
legislate in partial compliance with the federal grant and thus be in a position to
complain that the conditions placed upon the grant are an unconstitutional invasion
of state powers.
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requirement for each of the offices of representative, 55 senator, 56
and president; 57 a prohibition on appointment of members of
Congress to offices created or whose compensation was increased during their term; 58 a prohibition against members of
Congress holding concurrently any other office under the
United States;58 a restriction on the receipt of presents, compensation, offices, or titles from any foreign state by a federal
office holder; 60 a:hd a limitation of the presidency to two elected
terms. 61 Also, the Constitution requires publication of an account of receipts and expenditures of all public money. 62
The basic purpose of these provisions is to protect the
political process ·from recognized dangers-immaturity, selfinte~est; foreign domination, secrecy, or perpetuation in the
form of dependence on the individual leader rather than the
democratic system. While some individual may receive an injury from ali action forbidden by such constitutional commands, such an injury is incidental; there is no suggestion that
the violated provisions were enacted to protect specific individual intere.sts. 63 Instead, these constitutional commands are
drawn to protect the democratic system. Thus, some individu~ls have seen these clauses as appropriate for enforcement by
~y citizE:ln l;Jecaus~ every citizen has an interest in a properly
functioning political system. · ·
·
55

"No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of
twenty five Years." U.S. CaNST.. art. I, § 2, cl.2.
51 "No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty
Years." U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 3, cl.3.
11 "No Person ..• shall be eligible to the Office of President ••. who shall not
·
have attained to the Age of thirty five Years."
CaNST. art.
cl.5.
11 "No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected,
be app6inted to any civii Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall
have been created, or the E~oluments whereof shall have been increased during such
time•••. " U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 6, cl.2.
" ·"[N]o Pers'on holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member
of' either House during his Continuance in Office."
CaNST. art. I, § 6, cl.2.
• "[N)o Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under [the United States],
shall, without the Consent of Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or
Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State." U.S. CaNST. art.
I, § 9, cl.8. ·
11
"No person shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice..••"
CaNST. amend.
§ 1. ,
12 "[A) regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all
public Money shall be published from time to time." U.S. CaNST. art. I,§ 9, c1.7.
13 See note 28 supra for related material and further discussion.

u.s.

n,

u.s.

u.s.

xxn,
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At this point we have reason to revert to the fundamental
issue-whether granting standing to such persons will best assure that the Constitution is followed. Judicial review enforces
constitutional guarantees not merely through the particular
orders of the Court but also by the deterrence effect which the
threat of judicial response provides. 64 Even if citizens are denied standing to redress "political injuries," the government
official considering potentially unconstitutional action still
faces the possibility of check from another body. Certain individuals or groups can force a confrontation before the courts.
For example, election officials may refuse to list a candidate on
the ballot because the candidate fails to meet the age qualifications. Legislators tempted to increase rewards of an office they
desire may be thwarted by presidential failure to appoint or
congressional refusal to confirm. Presidents tempted to keep
gifts may be faced with congressional legislation to the contrary, and an executive desire to keep expenditures hidden may
be defeated by a congressional command for a statement of
accounts. Flagrant attempts to violate the process provisions
are likely to be challenged by bodies who have no interest in
seeing the Constitution violated. Thus the existence of the constitutional prohibition and the power of disinterested individuals or groups to prevent a violation secures a large measure of
obedience to the constitutional dictates.
Nevertheless, individual citizens may perceive a violation
of a process provision that is not attacked by any other individual or group. If such an individual brings suit to remedy the
improper action, that suit will present the Court with difficulties that would not be present if suit had been brought pursuant to a statute or against an official who claims constitutional grounds mandate his actions-such as an official who
refuses to list a candidate for election. The Court must go beyond merely deciding whether the act violates the Constitution. It must also develop a remedy. If the act is pending, the
Court will refuse to take the case because the injury may not
11 To some extent, this statement cannot be proved. We have, however, a deep
tradition for obeying court orders. See Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65
CoLUM. L. REV. 1001 (1965) on the extent to which judicial decisions may be ignored
by government officials.

HeinOnline -- 67 Ky. L.J. 167 1978-1979

168

1<ENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 67

occur. 85 Once the act has taken place, however, the remedy will
never successfully eliminate the violation. 66 These remedial difficulties alone do not justify a refusal to hear the case, 67 but
they do indicate that the more focused case precipitated by
another group would be preferable. The remedial difficulties
which make the case awkward are demonstrated by the following.
Justice Black was appointed to the Supreme Court although he was a member of the federal legislature when pensions were established for members of the Court. A citizen later
sued, claiming that Justice Black's subsequent appointment to
the Supreme Court violated the Constitution. 68 The Court dismissed the suit for lack of standing. If the Court had taken the
case, it would hav.e faced a bewildering array of alternatives.
It might have barred Justice Black from future deliberations
and from drawing any salary, imposed a temporary bar until
the next session of the legislature, reversed all decisions in
which he participated and set them for reargument, changed
orders only in those decisions where Justice Black provided the
margin for decision, invalidated the pension entirely or only as
applied to Justice Black, or held the appointment to be constitutional. The constitutional provision is apparently intended to
prevent a vote influenced by the desire to obtain the office
concerned. If the vote is taken, no subsequent penalty against
the legislator will undo the vote. An attempt to undo the vote
by invalidating the salary increase has several drawbacks,
among them the fact that the law becomes invalid as a result
of action subsequent to its enactment. 69
The point of this discussion is quite simple. Whenever a
"process provision" is violated, there are always individuals or
15 This is in furtherance of the judicial policy of refusing to decide a constitutional
issue before it is necessary to do so. See note 39 supra for further discussion.
" Even in the cases where the remedy would be fairly effective, such as forcing a
statement of expenditures of public funds, there will be a period in which no such
statement has been published and the delay is likely to result in some actions being
taken in ignorance.
11 See text accompanying notes 33-34 supra for a justification of this statement.
" Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937).
" This creates problems for those who received increased salaries prior to the
legislator's appointment. The provision itself appears directed at appointment rather
than at prohibiting the vote.
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groups with power to raise the issues who would present a better case than the average citizen. Since the interest of those
groups and individuals is the same as the average citizen's, it
would be preferable for such other persons to raise the issue.
In the event that none of the more desirable groups raises
the constitutional issue, there is still no significant threat to
that structure of government envisioned by the Constitution.
Flagrant violations of the basic process provisions are unlikely
to occur. The existence of the language of the prohibition and
groups with power to challenge constitutional violations will
sufficiently deter violations. If the individual citizen does bring
suit without the support of those groups in a better situation
to present the case, the court is likely to be unsympathetic. If
standing is granted, the courts may tend to favor the fait
accompli and thereby create a body of constitutional interpretation which permits action close to the constitutional line.
This in turn will weaken the arguments available to individuals
and groups in a position to challenge subsequent similar acts.
The net effect of permitting citizen standing to attack
"process" violations could well be to weaken constitutional
guarantees. The basic interest of the citizen is in the effective
operation of the system of government, yet citizen standing for
violation of a process provision is likely to reduce the effectiveness of that same provision.
IV.

NEW WINE IN AN OLD F'LAST

In the recent cases in which the Court denied standing, the
citizen plaintiff alleged a "process provision" violation which
harmed all persons in society equally, 70 not a minority group
which needed special protection from the majoritarian process.
Even though these constitutional provisions are insulated from
the majoritarian process, there are, as previously noted, sufficient checks without citizen standing.
Violation of the guarantees of establishment and religious
freedom stands on quite different footing. These provisions are
71
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); United
States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974). All citizens are entitled to a legislature
without conflicts of interests and to a statement of accounts, which were the questions
at issue in these two cases, respectively.
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evidently intended to protect religious minorities from the religious majority. Often the standing issue poses no problem for
challenges to alleged first amendment religious freedom violations. A law may either prohibit religious activity or command
it, thus impinging on the liberty of the individual and producing a "victim" who has standing. Other co-religionists not directly subject to the law may be offended by it, but they have
no standing. Thus, in Doremus v. Board of Education, 11 the
Court held that there was no standing in citizens or taxpayers
to protest Bible reading in schools although the school children
themselves would have standing. 72
Flast, however, poses a situation without identifiable victims. Instead of compelling persons to accept or reject a particular religion, the government merely gives money to one religion. The use of the governmental process to foster religious
beliefs antithetical to ·some citizens violates the rights of those
persons (presumably a minority) to be free of governmental aid
to opposing religious viewpoints. Injury arising from aid to
competing religions is that kind of harm which the Constitution intended to prevent. 73 Thus persons with views opposing
those given aid should have standing. Unlike the "process"
violations in which the injury is identical as to all citizens,
violations of the establishment clause affect different groups.
The harm is not that the violation skews the political process,
but that it does harm to religion. If citizen standing were extended to include all cases of governmental acts favoring religious beliefs, it is only with respect to Flast-type expenditures
pursuant to the spending power that the individual taxpayer
will· be the best "victim."
The function of the double nexus test in Flast is now apparent. While the citizen may claim the government has a duty
to abide by the Constitution in all its acts, the taxpayer's
claimed relationship to government is financial and not political. His only tenable claim is that the government not spend
money in a fashion which is forbidden. Since regulatory programs affect an individual directly, the Flast requirement that
71

342 u.s. 429 (1952).

n ld. at 434-35.
73
The establishment clause is also intended to forbid governmental involvement
in religion because of the threat that it poses to the integrity of that religion.
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the challenge be made to a spending and not a regulatory program serves the purposes of limiting standing to those cases in
which a traditional victim cannot be found. 74
The taxpayer's complaint is similar to that of the citizen
in the "political injury" suit-the Constitution 'has been violated although no "victim" can be found. Neither claim involves a personal stake and both allege violation of an abstract
right. The second half of the Flast test provides the crucial
distinction. The requirement of a specific prohibition eliminates the ability of a taxpayer to sue to preserve an allocation
of powers when others have a stronger interest in preservation.
By tying the specific prohibition to the spending power, the
Court avoids the "political injury" type suits which attack the
decision-making process. Limitations on the exercise of power,
as opposed to limitations on who can appropriately exercise it,
are invariably protections directed at individuals and minority
groups. Such individuals and minority groups are the only
"victims" when such power is abused. Thus, the dual nexus
test in Flast functions to isolate the case in which a governmental act transgresses constitutional provisions designed for the
protection of a minority but does not impair the life, liberty,
or property of any member of that group. In this unique situation, the constitutional provisions are more effectively guaranteed by granting standing to citizen-taxpayers. The filing of the
suit by the taxpayer demonstrates his objection and thus
places him within the group to be protected.
CONCLUSION

The Court's decisions on citizen and taxpayer standing
have focused on the difficulties, real or imagined, of hearing
such suits. The opinions have not evaluated such suits as
means to effectuate constitutional guarantees. Thus the twin
nexus test in Flast appears to be artificial and insupportable.
By concentrating on the interest protected by the Constitution
and the need for minority protection, the requirement of a
71

"This type of legislation is the type which is least likely to injure any individual
directly; thus it could conceivably exceed constitutional limitations and never produce
the traditional plaintiff." Hennigan, The Essence of Standing: The Basis of a Constitutional Right to Be Heard, 10 ARIZ. L. REv. 438, 449 (1968).
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spending power claim coupled with a specific constitutional
prohibition is intelligible. The institutions of government protect the democratic process better than citizen suits except
when the challenged actions invade minority rights. In that
context, the twin nexus of Flast serves to establish proper representatives of the affected minority-the individual whose liberty is invaded by the regulation, or the citizen or taxpayer if
the only injury is financial support to religion.
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